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THE LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING

POWER
JACK GOSE-

I
Of recent years much publicity has been given to the activities
of congressional investigating committees At the present time such
a committee is engaged in examining witnesses and taking evidence
concerning the operations of munitions manufacturers. About a
year ago a similar investigation of much publc interest was held
coneerning the matter of air mail contracts. In the decade immediately preceding, the scandals arising out of the Harding administration formed the subject of similiar inquiries. Many like rncidents within present-day memory might be cited, but the mention
of any single recent investigation should not create the impression that congressional activity of this character is a matter of
recent development. Such investigations have been held at frequent intervals ever since the origin of the Federal Government.'
Before that time, their counterparts existed in the colonial legislatures, which in turn doubtless adopted this practice from the
British Parliament.
Despite this long history, it was not until recent years that the
extent of congressional power received comprehensive definition in
the Supreme Court of the United States. It is true that some
phases of the problem had been passed upon prior to that time, but
in its more important aspects the problem remained a subject of
practical legal controversy until the decision of McGrazu v. Daugherty2 in 1927. Since then the scrutiny of the courts has been directed chiefly to a clarification of details-a process which in fact
is still going on.
At the outset it may be observed that the matter is one which
essentially invites controversy, both from the standpoint of policy
and law. Even now that the legal limitations are for the most part
well prescribed, charges and countercharges are hurled back and
* Of the Seattle Bar.

2For comprehensive historical reviews, see Landis, Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Investigating Power (1926), 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 153; also, Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691, McGrain vi. Daugherty, 273 U. S.
135, 71 L. Ed. 580, 47 Sup. Ct. 319 (1927).
2273 U. S. 135, 71 L. Ed. 580, 47 Sup. Ct. 319 (1927).
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forth between advocates and opponents of each investigation, directed to the wisdom or the utility or good policy of their conduct.
The sincere advocates see only an effort toward better government
and a resulting benefit to society from using the investigating
process to inform the legislative branch of government upon existing conditions, so that it may better discharge its functions3 The
opponents of the process, on the other hand, see only an attempt
to try the persons or businesses involved at the bar of public
opinion before an unfair and politically prejudiced tribunal. 4 As
a matter of fact, the whole question is so closely identified with
political conflict as to make any agreement upon the question of
policy impossible. It probably most nearly approximates truth to
say that the advocates of congressional investigations have theory
upon their side, and that in practice there is much to substantiate
the charges of the opposition. However, even this statement is
open to challenge, and it is the function of this article to approach
the question from an entirely dispassionate standpoint and to consider only what limits, if any, have been imposed upon the power
by the courts.
Controversy has extended as well to the legal aspects of the matter, and the treatment of the subject by various writers for legal
periodicals has, in the last analysis, been largely devoted to advocacy for or against the existence of broad congressional power. 5
Insofar as it is possible to do so, this discussion will avoid the
legal as well as practical phases of dispute.
II
The investigating power of Congress as discussed in this article
is automatically limited to determining the power of Congress to
compel attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production
of books, records and papers and the punishment of persons refusing to testify or produce such documents after demand. Of course,
Congress or a committee appointed by either of its houses has the
unquestioned power to receive information voluntarily given. It is
only when some person believed to possess information refuses to
appear or testify or to furnish the particular information requested
See case note 15 Georgetown L. Rev. 344, a sample of optimistic endorsement.
I Stebbins, Limitations of the Powers of Congressional Investigating
Committees (1930), 16 A. B. A. 425.
See notes 1, 3 and 4, supra, also, in a more moderate vein: For the
power, Coudert, Congressional Inquisition v. Individual Liberty (1929),
15 Va. L. Rev. 537 against, Loring, Powers of Congressional Investigating Committees (1924), 8 Minn. L. Rev. 595, generally impartial note by
Wigmore (1925), 19 Ill. L. Rev. 452; Shull, Congress and Its Witnesses
(1931) 5 Temple L. Q. 425.
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that the matter becomes of any legal interest. The threat or use
of punitive methods to compel obedience is then met with a challege of congressional power, and a justiciable problem is presented.
In searching for the source of the asserted power the first inquiry
must be directed to the Federal Constitution. Respecting the
powers of Congress the Constitution provides.
"All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a congress of the United States, which shall consist of

a senate and house of representatives." Art. I, §1.
"
The house of representatives shall choose their
speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power
of impreachment." Art. I, §2.
"c
The senate shall have the sole power to try all
impeachments.
" Art. I, §2.
"Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business,
but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and
may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent
members, in such manner and under such penalties as
each house may provide.
"Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.
" Art. I, §5.
In addition, the Constitution, of course, contains a statement of
the subjects upon which Congress is authorized to legislate, which
are further amplified under the doctrine of implied powers. 6
There is, then, no specific constitutional provision authorizing
compulsory production of testimony by either house of Congress,
and that power, so far as it exists, must of necessity arise by implication.
It will be noted from the sections quoted from the Constitution
that the powers of Congress, generally speaking, fall into three
classes. First, legislative powers, second, the power to control the
internal affairs of each house and to discipline its members and
pass upon their qualifications, third, the power to impeach, vested
in the House of Representatives, and the power vested in the Senate to try such impeachment. The question therefore is Does the
power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production
of testimony follow as an implied incident to the constitutional
grant of any or all of the above general powers 9
Let us examine the decisions to ascertain the views expressed by
the courts upon these matters.
'McCufloch v. Maryiand, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
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III
The first decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
generally considered to bear upon the question is Anderson v.
Dunn,7 This was an action for assault and battery and false imprisonment, brought against the sergeant-at-arms of the House of
Representatives. The defendant pleaded justification of his conduct, in that he acted under a properly issued warrant of the
House. The pleadings in the common law form are set out at length
in the report of the case, but do not inform as to the actual cause
for which the plaintiff was arrested. This matter likewise does not
appear specifically from the opinion itself, but apparently the
plaintiff was charged with attempting to bribe a member of the
House, and that body was engaged in punishing him for contempt.' Thus the only matter actually under consideration was
the power of the House of Representatives to punish for contempt
a person guilty of a grave breach of decorum toward it. The opinion is for the most part a generalization of the law respecting this
matter. The conclusion reached is that, on principles of self-preservation necessary for the proper maintenance of government and
the dignity of one of its foremost instrumentalities, the power to
commit for such contempt is unquestionable. Obviously this case
has only an indirect bearing upon the matter considered by this
article. However, in concluding, the court makes the following
statement
"As to the minor points made in this case, it is only
necessary to observe, that there is nothing on the face of
this record from which it can appear on what evidence
this warrant was issued. And we are not to presume that
the house of representatives would have issued it without
duly establishing the fact charged on the individual."
Out of this and other general language, the notion seems to have
arisen that the case stood for the proposition that the determinaof a house of Congress that a person was guilty of contempt was
conclusive, and that the courts would not attempt to go behind the
decision of the legislature upon the matter of guilt. It requires, to
say the least, a most liberal construction of the opinion to attribute
such a meaning to it, and, in any event, such a construction has
been definitely discarded in the later cases.'
'6 Wheat. 204 (1821).
OKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 196 (1880) Landis, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Investigating Power (1926) 40 Harv.
L. Rev.
153, 213.
0
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
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IV
The direct question of the investigating power of Congress and
the mcidental power to punish for contempt first came before the
Supreme Court of the United States in Kilbourn v. Thompson 0
in 1880. It is surprising that more than ninety years elapsed between the adoption of the Constitution and the first actual test of
this question before the nation's highest tribunal, especially since
numerous investigations of one kind or another had taken place in
the intervening period"- The case arose out of the bankruptcy of
the firm of Jay Cooke & Co. As the basis for the investigation,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution reciting that the
United States Government was a creditor of Jay Cooke & Co., resulting from improvident deposits made by the Secretary of the
Navy with the London branch of that concern. The resolution
further recited that a matter known as the real-estate pool had
only been partially inquired into by a previous general committee of Congress, that the trustee in bankruptcy of Jay Cooke &
Co. had -made a settlement with the associates of the firm to the disadvantage and loss, as it was alleged, of numerous creditors of the
estate, including the United States Government, and that the courts
by reason of such settlement were powerless to give adequate redress to the creditors. On the strength of these recitals the resolution directed the appointment by the speaker of a committee of
five members to inquire into "the matter and history of said realestate pool and the character of said settlement, with the amount
of property involved in which Jay Cooke & Co. were interested,
and the amount paid or to be paid in settlement, with power to
send for persons and papers and report to the House."
Such a committee was appointed and it subpoenaed Kilbourn to
appear and testify Kilbourn appeared, but refused to answer the
following question.
"Will you state where each of the five -members reside,
and will you please state their names?"
He likewise refused to produce records which the committee
had demanded under a subpoena duces tecum. The committee
then reported these refusals to the House, stating that it was of
the opinion that obedience on the part of the witness was essential
to the proper conduct of the inquiry, and that there was no sufficient reason for his refusal to comply with the demands made.
The House then passed a resolution ordering the speaker to issue
a warrant requiring Kilbourn to appear before the House itself.

10Note 9, supra.
1 Note 1, supra.
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In the execution of this warrant Kilbourn was arrested by the sergeant-at-arms, brought before the House, and, still refusing to
answer the question or produce the requested papers, was committed for contempt and placed m the custody of the sergeant-atarms in the common jail of the District of Columbia until he
might see fit to submit to the demands of the investigating committee. He was later released from custody upon a writ of habeas
corpus, and then brought suit against the sergeant-at-arms and
all of the members of the investigating committee, seeking damages
for false imprisonment. The defendants by way of defense pleaded
all the circumstances above stated.1" The plaintiff demurred to the
plea, and, the demurrer having been overruled, plaintiff appealed
to the Supreme Court.
The importance of this decision, standing as it does as the ear
liest authority upon the scope of congressional investigating power,
cannot be over emphasized. The case has in later times been examined and re-examined, frequently with the surprising result that
persons representing directly conflicting views have construed the
case as authority for equally conflicting propositions.'" In fact,
upon close examination, the decision does not admit of any serious
debate, but it is essential to an underdtanding of the later decisions to determine just what the court actually decided.
In entering upon the discussion, Mr. Justice Miller, the author
of the decision, states
"The argument before us has assumed a very wide
range, and includes the discussion of almost every suggestion that can well be conceived on the subject. The two
extremes of the controversy are, the proposition on the
part of the plaintiff, that the House of Representatives
has no power whatever to punish for a contempt of its
authority, and on the part of the defendants, that such
power undoubtedly exists, and when that body has formally exercised it, it must be presumed that it was rightfully exercised."
He then, in the following language, disposes of the idea that the
congressional power over witnesses is unlimited.
"Conceding for the sake of the argument that there
are cases in which one of the two bodies, that constitute
the Congress of the United States, may punish for con" The defendant members of Congress also pleaded immunity under
Art. I, §6, of the Constitution, providing that senators and representatives
"shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their
respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any
other place."
"For example, Ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620 (1924).
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tempt of its authority, or disregard of its orders, it will
scarcely be contended by the most ardent advocate of their
power in that respect that it is unlimited."
The court then notes the absence of express constitutional authority empowering Congress to employ compulsory process for
investigating purposes, and launches into an inquiry as to the
existence and extent of implied power of such a character. In aid
of the power, the defendants had urged that it existed as an incident to the "legislative powers" granted by the Constitution.
More specifically it was contended that the phrase "legislative
powers" included the prerogatives of the House of Commons of
England, from which it was asserted that the American system
of parliamentary law was derived. Admittedly the House of Commons had long held and employed the power to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses. 14 The value of the English practice as a precedent was examined in great detail, and rejected. The
court said
"We are of the opinion that the right of the House of
Representatives to punish the citizen for a contempt of
its authority or a breach of its privileges can derive no
support from the precedents and practices of the two
Houses of the English Parliament, nor from the adjudged cases in which the English courts have upheld
these practices."
This conclusion is reached upon the view that the power of the
House of Commons in this respect is a consequence of the peculiar
historical development of that body derived from the fact that
originally the Parliament of England, before separation into the
two Houses of Lords and Commons, exercised many judicial functions and was, in fact, known as the High Court of Parliament, havmg in consequence many judicial as well as legislative powers.
At this point it is only proper to state that historians and legal
commentators have challenged the accuracy of argument. 5 So
far, however, as the Supreme Court of the United States is concerned, Kilbourn v. Thompson seems to have been accepted as a
conclusive determination upon this point. 6
The court did not, however, reject 'the broader contention that
the power existed as a necessary incident to the grant of "legslative powers." Instead, it expressly declined to pass upon this
question, saying •
"Note 1, supra.
"Note 1, supra.
"Followed in Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. Ed. 881, 37 Sup.
Ct. 448 (1917).
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"Nor, taking what has fallen from the English judges,
and especially the latest cases on which we have just commented, is much aid given to the doctrine, that this power
exists as one necessary to enable either House of Congress to exercise successfully their function of legislation.
"This latter proposition is one which we do not propose to decide in the present case, because we are unable to
decide it without passing on the existence or non-existence
of such power m aid of the legislative function."
In the light of the last paragraph above quoted, there can, then,
be no doubt that Kilbourn v. Thompson did not purport to pass
upon the power of Congress to conduct an investigation in aid of
its legislative functions. From what immediately precedes this last
quoted paragraph, one is, as a matter of fact, given some reason
to suspect that the personnel of the court which decided Kitbourn
v. Thompson would have been inclined to regard such an investigation with disfavor, but that comment is, in the light of what follows, clearly dictum.
This particular phase of the problem disposed of, the court next
proceeds, in what also may be regarded as dictum, to recognize the
possible power of each house of Congress to require testimony and
punish witnesses for disobedience in cases involving the election
and qualification of members of Congress and the impeachment
of goverenment officers. Although, strictly speaking, this is dictum,
there can be no doubt that it expresses the law of the present day 11
Leaving dictum and coming to the law of the case, we find the
following pronouncement
"Whether the power of punishment in either House by
fine or imprisonment goes beyond this or not, we are sure
that no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required
in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these bodies
possesses the general power of making inquiry into the
private affairs of the citizen."
This is the classic statement of the rule of Kilbourn v. Thompson. Applying this rule to the facts before it, the court concluded
that the investigation into the affairs of Jay Cooke & Co. was an
inquiry into private affairs, and hence, beyond the power of Congress.
Referring to the resolution which formed the basis of the inquiry, the court finds that the only matters to be inquired into
were those which already were in the courts, and that the courts
" In re Chap-man, 166 U. S. 661, 41 L. Ed. 1154, 17 Sup. Ct. 677 (1896)
Barri, v. United wtates, 279 U. S. 597, 73 L. Ed. 867 49 Sup. Ct. 453
(1929).
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alone were adequate to redress any wrongs winch might exist, or,
viewed from the reverse side, Congress was without power to act
upon the matters into which it sought to inquire. This discussion
is attended by extended comment on the doctrine of separation of
powers, in which, as in other parts of the opinion, the court
stresses the view that the power to compel production of testimony
is a judicial function, and that the judicial powers of the legislative branch of government are limited to a very few matters.
The emphasis thus placed upon separation of powers has been
regarded as technically incorrect. It has been said that the process
of compelling attendance and testimony of witnesses is not an exclusive judicial function, but rather that within the proper sphere
of legislative activity it is as much a legislative as a judicial function, although in truth employed much less frequently by the former branch of government than the latter."8 The critics upon this
point, therefore, contend that the court should rather have decided
that the particular inquiry involved was not within the scope of the
legislative powers of Congress. From a technical standpoint there
is much to be said for this view, but, practically, the matter is not
of great importance. 19
The result achieved in Kilbiourn v. Thompson is correct. An
examination of the original resolution leads to the irresistible conclusion that the House of Representatives had no notion of exercising any legislative function, but rather was proceeding only
to take some action looking to redress for the creditors of Jay
Cooke & Co. It is true, as will appear in the discussion of the later
cases, that the absence of recital of a proper legislative function
as the basis for an investigation will not invalidate the proceedings
if the subject matter of the inquiry is in fact within the scope of
legislative action.20 But even this does not go so far as to justify
an investigation, if the resolution itself positively indicates that the
legislative body had an entirely different purpose in mind.
Despite the nature of the resolution, there are, however, commentators who, in advocating the existence of extensive powers of
congressional investigating committees, criticize the court for hav
ing taken too narrow a view of the purpose of this inquiry, and
contend that there were subjects involved in the inquiry which
could have formed the subject of legislation. 21 Further, it is very

11Note by

Wigmore (1925), 19 Ill. L. Rev. 452.
"But see Barry v. U. S., note 17, supra, which declares "In exercising
the power Ito judge of the elections returns and qualifications of its
members, the Senate acts as a judicial tribunal
" The same is doubtless true of Impeachment -trials. Inquiries In aid of legislative action
differ In nature from the foregoing, but the problem Is at any rate one
of denomination only.
'In re Chapman, note 17, supra.
2140 Harv. L. Rev. 153, note 1, supra.
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likely that if Kilbourn v. Thompson were to arise today, the case
would be extensively argued to the court upon this theory, and
possibly a different decision would result. Without, however, discussing this matter in further detail, it seems that upon the questions involved, as presented to the court, the case was correctly
decided.
Naturally, in considering the case, the court recognized the right
of the judicial branch of the government to pass upon the propriety of a congressional investigation. The defendant urged that
Anderson v. DUnn 22 stood for the proposition that the legislative
determination as to the existence of the power to punish for contempt is conclusive. The court, however, declined to accept this
view
The decision, of course, concluded with the reversal of the decision of the lower court so as to sustain the demurrer to the plea
of the sergeant-at-arms. The defendant members of Congre.s,
however, were dismissed from the cast under the theory of constitutional privilege.
Summarizing this decision, we find an enunciation of the following propositions
1. Congressional power to punish for contempt is not unlimited.
2. Such power as does exist, of necessity arises by implication.
3. The power to punish for contempt of the authority of a house
of Congress or a breach of its privileges derives no support from
English parliamentary practice, and, by way of dictum, that the
English practice likewise does not give much aid to the doctrine
of the existence of such a power as one necessary to enable Congress
to exercise the legislative function.
4. Recognition, again by way of dictum, of the probable existence of the power to punish a contumacious witness upon hearings
involving the qualification or election of members of Congress or
impeachment of government officers.
5. That there is no power in either house of Congress or a committee appointed thereby to conduct a general inquiry into the
private affairs of a citizen and that such was the nature of the
attempted investigation in the case at bar.
V
Following the decision in Kilbourn v Thompson sixteen years
elapsed before any similar question came before the Supreme
Court, in In re Chapman.23 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus
""Note 7, supra.
I Note 17, supra.
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was held 3n. that proceeding, the petitioner seeking to have declared invalid a conviction for contempt of Congress under Sections 102, 103, 104 and 859,24 Revised Statutes. The facts were
that Congress was engaged in the enactment of a tariff bill, which,
among other things, involved duties upon the import of sugar, the
passage or rejection of wich would materially affect the market
value of the stock of the American Sugar Refinng Company
Charges had appeared in the press that members of the Senate
were yielding to corrupt influences in the consideration of the
tariff bill, and accordingly an investigation was initiated to inqure into the substance of these charges. In the course of that
investigation the petitioner, a member of a firm of stock brokers
in New York, appeared as a witness and was asked whether his
firm had bought or sold any sugar stocks during a part of the year
1894 for the account of any United States senator. Upon his refusal to answer, he was tried under the authority of the statutes
mentioned, and convieted. The petitioner had expressly waived his
right to refrain from self-incrimination,2 5 and Sections 10326 and
859,27 which concern the exercise of that privilege, were eliminated
from consideration. Only Sections 102 and 104, Revised Statutes,
then, were involved, the text of these sections being as follows
"See. 102. Every person who, having been summoned
as a witness by either House of Congress, to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any committee of either
House of Congress, wilfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent
to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, and
imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one
month nor more than twelve months."
"See. 104. Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned
in section one hundred and two fails to testify and the
facts are reported to either House, the President of the
"Sees. 102 and 104 are set out hereinafter in the text.
See. 103. No witness is privileges to refuse to testify to any fact.
or to produce any paper, respecting which he shall be examined by either
House of Congress, or by any committee of either House, upon -the ground
that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend
to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous."
'Sec. 859. No testimony given by a witness before either House, or
before any committee of either House of Congress, shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in any court, except in a
prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony. But an
official paper or record produced by him is not within the said privilege."
Fifth Amendment, Constitution of the United States.
Note 24, supra.
Note 24, supra.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Senate or the Speaker of the House, as the case may be,
shall certify the fact under the seal of the Senate or
House to the district attorney for the District of Columbia, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the
grand jury for their action."
The court first held that the reference in Section 102 to "any
matter under inquiry" required reasonable construction, and that
such a construction must limit the scope of the statute to inquiries
actually within the jurisdiction of the two houses of Congress
and to questions pertinent thereto and to facts or papers bearing
thereon. So construed, the court held that the statute was not too
broad to be valid.
Considering next the power of the Senate to conduct the par
ticular inquiry involved, the court notices the various powers
granted to Congress by the Constitution, including, among others,
that relating to control of its members, and likewise notes the rule
of Kilbourne v Thompson 8 prohibiting an inquiry into the private
affairs of a citizen. In distinguishing that case and establishing the
power of the Senate in the instant case, the court states
"The case at bar is wholly different. Specific charges
publicly made against Senators had been brought to the
attention of the Senate, and the Senate had determined
that investigation was necessary The subject-matter as
affecting the Senate was within the jurisdiction of the
Senate. The questions were not intrusions into the affairs
of the citizen, they did not seek to ascertain any facts as
to the conduct, methods, extent or details of the business
of the firm in question, but only whether that firm, confessedly engaged in buying and selling stocks, and the
particular stock named, was employed by any Senator to
buy or sell for him any of that stock, whose market price
might be affected by the Senate's action. We cannot regard these questions as amounting to an unreasonable
search into the private affairs of the witness simply because he may have been in some degree connected with the
alleged transactions, and as investigations of this sort are
within the power of either of the two Houses they cannot
be defeated on purely sentimental grounds."
The court then found that the questions put were pertinent to
the inquiry, saying.
"The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry The resolutions directed the
committee to inquire 'whether any Senator has been, or
is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during
the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate.' What the Senate might or might not do upon the
"Note

9, &szpra.
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facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called
upon to inquire whether such ventures night be defensible, as contended in argument, but it is plain that
negative answers would have cleared that body of what
the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on
the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers."
The resolution upon which the inquiry was based contained no
recital indicating the purpose of the investigation, but this was
held to be innaterial.
"Nor will it do to hold that the Senate has no jurisdiction to pursue the particular inquiry because the pre.
amble and resolutions did not specify that the proceedings
were taken for the purpose of censure or expulsion, if
certain facts were disclosed by the investigation. The matter was within the range of the constitutional powers of
the Senate. The resolutions adequately indicated that the
transactions referred to were deemed by the Senate reprehensible and deserving of condemnation and punishment. The right to expel extends to all cases where the
offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member. 1 Story on
Const., §838.
We cannot assume on this record that the action of the
Senate was without a legitimate object, and so encroach
upon the province of that body Indeed, we think it
affirmatively appears that the Senate was acting within its
right, and it was certainly not necessary that the resolutions should declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when the investigation was concluded."
In concluding its opinion, the court disposed of the petitioner's
contention that the statute was invalid, since disobedience of a
witness is punishable by the Senate itself as contempt. In this
proposition the court said.
"Nevertheless, although the power to punish for contempt still remains in each House, we must decline to
decide that this law is invalid because it provides that
contumacy in a witness called to testify in a matter properly under consideration by either House, and deliberately
refusing to answer questions pertinent thereto, shall be
a misdemeanor against the United States, who are interested that the authority of neither of their departments,
nor of any branch thereof shall be defied and set at
naught. It is improbable that in any case cumulative penalties would be imposed, whether by way of punishment
merely, or of eliciting answers desired, but it is quite
clear that the contumacious witness is not subjected to
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jeopardy twice for the same offence, since the same act
may be an offence against one jurisdiction and also an
offence against another, and indictable statutory offences
may be punished as such, while the offender may likewise
be subjected to punishment for the same acts as contempts, the two being diverso intuitu and capable of
standing together."
In keeping with the foregoing proposition, the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus was denied.
Recapitulating the points developed, we find
First. That the Senate has the power to hold an investigation
in matters which concern the conduct of its members.2 9 As we
have already noted, this power was recognized by way of dictum
in Kilbourn v. Thompson.
Second. That it is unnecessary that the resolution authorizing
the investigation recite its purpose, if m fact the subject matter
of the inquiry is one within the range of congressional power.
Third. That two methods of punishment are available, the first
being commitment for contempt by a house of Congress, and the
second being prosecution in the courts under the sections of the
Revised Statutes above mentioned. 30
In re Chapman contains nothing in conflict with the propositions announced in Kilbourn v. Thompson.
VI
Following In re Chapman twenty-one years elapsed before the
next decision, Marshall v. Gordon,31 in 1917 This action, in the
form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dealt with a rather
amusing state of fact. It appeared that a member of the House
of Representatives, on the floor of that body charged the petitioner,
who was the district attorney of the Southern District of New
York, with many acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance. At the
time, the grand jury of the Southern District of New York was
engaged in investigating alleged illegal conduct of this member
of the House with respect to the Sherman Anti-Trust law and other
" Like power was sustained in Barry v. U. S., 229 U. S. 597, 73 L. Ed.
867, 49 Sup. Ct. 452 (1929) upon an inquiry into the qualifications of Vare
of Pennsylvania to take his seat in the Senate. One Cunningham, who
had declined to testify before a Senate committee as to the source of campaign contributions, was arrested to be brought before the Senate itself to
answer "questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry." The validity
of the warrant was sustained, and the powers of the Senate stated to
be those of a judicial tribunal in such cases. See note 19, supra.
0 The optional courses have both been from time to time without any
apparent uniformity of program.
-1Note 16, supra.
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matters. Upon tins investigation the grand jury preferred an
indictment against the nember of Congress. The latter thereupon
retaliated by requesting that the Judiciary Committee of the
House inquire into a report concerning the charges winch he had
made against the district attorney, with a-view to possible impeachment. Tins request was granted by the House, and a committee
was appointed, which proceeded to New York to take testimony
Friction immediately developed between the office of the district
attorney and the commttee, the former charging that the latter
was seeking to penetrate unlawfully into the proceedings of the
grand jury Soon there appeared in the press an article charging
that the writer thereof was informed that the committee was endeavoring to investigate and frustrate the action of the grand jury
rather than to investigate the conduct of the district attorney The
committee asked the writer of the newspaper article to disclose
the name of his informant, and he refused to do so. Accordingly,
the writer was threatened with punishment for contempt of the
House. Thereupon the district attorney wrote a letter to the chairman of the committee, stating that he was the informant referred
to in the article, and that the charges there made were true,
repeating them in amplified form in language which, according to
the court, was "certainly unparliamentary and manifestly illtempered and winch was well calculated to arouse the indignation
not only of the members of the subcommittee but of those of the
House generally " Simultaneously, in keeping with the rather
common practice of public officials, the district attorney gave a
copy of the letter to the press so that it might be published at the
same time that it was received by the chairman of the committee.
Upon receipt of the letter the committee reported the matter to
the House, and a select committee was appointed to consider the
subject. The district attorney was called before that committee, and
re-asserted the charges made in the letter, stating further that they
were justified by the circumstances and under the same conditions
would be made again. Thereupon the select committee reported to
the House, saying that, in its opinion, the letter contained defamatory and insulting matter tending to bring the House into public
contempt and ridicule, and that the district attorney was guilty of
contempt of the House because of the violation of its privileges,
its honor and its dignity This report was adopted by the House,
a warrant issued, and the district attorney arrested by the sergeantat-arms, which procedure was followed immediately by application
for discharge on habeas corpus. The application was refused in
the lower court, but this decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court and the district attorney was released.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
In arriving at this result the court re-affirms that portion of
Kilbourn v. Tkompson 2 announcing the doctrine that the power of
a house of Congress to punish for contempt is not derivable from
any similar practice on the part of the English House of Commons. It further recognizes the fundamental rule that the only
punitive power vested in a house of Congress arises by implication
from the powers conferred by the Constitution. In passing upon
the extent of this implied power as applied to the facts presented,
the court says.
"What does this implied power embrace9 is thus the
question. In answering, it must be borne in mind that
the power rests simply upon the implication that the
right has been given to do that which is essential to the
execution of some other and substantive authority expressly conferred. The power is therefore but a force implied to bring into existence the conditions to which constitutional limitations apply It is a means to an end and
not the end itself. Hence it rests solely upon the right of
self-preservation to enable the public powers given to be
exerted."
The court further quotes from Anderson v. Dunn 3 3 the statement that the power possessed by a house of Congress to punish
for contempt is "the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed," and follows by laying down a practical test, embodied in
the following quotation
"Without undertaking to inclusively mention the subjects embraced in the implied power, we think from the
very nature of that power it is clear that it does not
embrace punishment for contempt as punishment, since
it rests only on the right of self-preservation, that is,
the right to prevent acts which in and of themselves inher
ently obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative
duty or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent
legislative power to compel in order that legislative functions may be performed."
In concluding, it was determined that though the conduct of
the district attorney might have been irritating to the House
nevertheless it was not obstructed in the exercise of any of its
proper functions, and therefore the petitioner was immune from
punishment as for contempt.
It will be observed that this case does not directly concern the
power of investigating committees, rather, like Anderson v. Dunn,
it deals with the general power of a house of Congress to punish
32Note 9, supra.
3 Note 7, supra.
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for contempt in a matter affecting its dignity No question was
presented concerning the power to hold the investigation or the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses. The
case has, however, been frequently considered on the strength of
the general principles which it announces, and, as will appear in
the last case discussed in this article, has been invoked directly in
a matter concerning the production of evidence upon a congressional investigation.34
Marshall v. Gordon directly determines only that the power of
a house of Congress to punish for contempt is limited to instances
in which the person charged with contempt has been guilty of some
act which in some way prevented or obstructed the house from
the exercise of its proper functions.*
3'McCracken v. Jurney, 72 F (2d) 560 (1934)
55 S. Ct. 385, (1935).
* To Be Continued.
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